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Drawing on Allan Newell’s “You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win,” this
article proposes that neuroscience needs to go beyond binary hypothesis testing and
design experiments that follow what neurons care about. Examples from Lettvin et. al.
are used to demonstrate that one can experimentally play with neurons and generate
surprising results. In this manner, brains are not confused with persons, rather, persons
are understood to do things with their brains.
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Allan Newell’s infamous 1973 commentary challenged the design
of cognitive neuroscience experiments: “You can’t play 20 ques-
tions with nature and win.” Delivered at a conference attended
by many titans of psychology—e.g., Mike Posner, Herbert Simon,
Lynn Cooper, Roger Shepard—Newell began,
I am a man who is half and half. Half of me is half-distressed and
half-confused. Half of me is quite content and clear on where we
are going. We have just listened to a sample of the best work in
current experimental psychology. . . and almost all of the material
shown here serves to further a view of man as a processor of infor-
mation, agreeing with my current theoretical disposition. Half of
me is ecstatic. . . .
Still, I am distressed (because imagining 40 more years of these
papers on new aspects of the problems), where will psychology
then be? Will we have achieved a science of man adequate in
power and commensurate with his complexity? And if so, how will
this have happened via these papers. . . ? Or will we be asking for
yet another quota of papers in the next dollop of time? (Newell,
1973, 1).
For Newell, you can’t play 20 questions with nature and win
because asking binary yes/no questions generates many papers
but settles almost nothing. It is inventive of methods but stops
too early. One “frame(s) a general question, hopefully binary, that
can be attacked experimentally. Having settled that bits-worth,
one can proceed to the next. The policy appears optimal—one
never risks much, there is feedback from nature at every step, and
progress is inevitable. Unfortunately, the questions never seem to
be really answered, the strategy does not seem to work1.” Newell
effectively describes an entrenched “thought style 2,” that fore-
closes real answers. Correlations between brain measurements
1Negative and positive appreciations of Newell’s claims may be found in
Kosslyn (2006) and Gigerenzer and Regier (1996).
2“Thought styles” were defined by historian of medicine Ludwig Fleck, who
found that different disciplines had distinct ways of assessing publishable
results (Fleck, 1981).
and cognitive psychology performances not only don’t add up to
causation, they have a good chance of diverting scientists from it,
precisely by seeming like a stopping point. The main risk for neu-
roscientists is not that they become wrong, but that they become
trivial:
Every time we find a new phenomenon. . .we produce a flurry of
experiments to investigate it. . . and the combinational variations
flow from our experimental laboratories. (Yet by only varying
issues and binaries,) matters simply become muddier and mud-
dier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the
rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity,
this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increas-
ing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but
never really settle. (Newell, 1973, 8)3.
In order to diagnose the core problem facing cognitive studies,
Newell looked at the crucial but ambiguous use of flow diagrams
in designing and confirming hypotheses. While they appeared to
be analogies of computers, they were in fact sloppy and incom-
plete, because a computer is only useful while running, and in
order to run, it needs a language, with operations and syntax.
Each running computer has an operating system, what Newell
called a “control structure,” that is essential to its being a running
computer.
Much of the new progress in the experimental analysis of the
information processing of humans has eschewed attention to
the control structure. The best example. . . is the deservedly well-
known paper by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) entitled: “Human
Memory: A proposed system and its control processes.” Themodel
of memory is there all right, and is applied to a number of tasks
with quantitative precision. However, the control structure is com-
pletely absent and is used as a deus ex machina to concoct separate
3Much more should be investigated concerning the synergy between this
thought style and the economics of academic audit and publish or perish
(Strathern, 2000; Biagioli and Galison, 2003; Mirowski, 2011).
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models for each task. Criticism is not directed at that justly influ-
ential piece of work. But it does illustrate well the current state of
the theoretical art. As long as the control structure—the glue—
is missing, so long will it be possible to suggest an indefinite
sequence of alternative possibilities for how a given task was per-
formed, hence to keep theoretical issues from becoming settled.
(Newell, 15).
For Newell, the ambiguous nature of the flow charts was the heart
of the neuroscience thought style and a key factor in its produc-
tivity (of articles) and its weakness (in really learning something).
Newell’s concern was that the notion of circuits and modules is
not inherently wrong about brains or minds, but is based on the
wrong idea of computers! As a programmer of early computers,
he starts from the same premise as Norbert Wiener, “The brain. . .
is not the complete analog of the computing machine but rather
the analogue of a single run on such a machine” (Weiner, 1948,
121)4 . The brain must be modeled not just in hardware or even
software, but running software, the kind that does not always boot
up the same way.
“Explanations must come to an end somewhere.” Thus
philosopher LudwigWittgenstein called attention to the historical
cultural practices by which people within a thought style behave
with regard to knowledge (Wittgenstein, 2010)5 . Some answers
cause us to ask more questions, while others somehow satisfy
us, in the sense that we no longer ask, “But why is that?” Why
are we satisfied when neuroscience finds a correlation between a
behavior and brain activation? Why isn’t that satisfaction most
perplexing? In my book, Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and
Biomedical Identity (Dumit, 2004), I queried: if a strong correla-
tion was found between a diagnosis of schizophrenia and blood
flow to the big toe, we would immediately ask, why? But even
if a less strong correlation was found between the diagnosis and
bloodflow in a small region of the brain, one would publish the
results and refer to a “region mediating schizophrenia” as having
finally been found.
Perhaps we can imagine a method that would instead take
correlation as the starting point for hypotheses. In a recent neu-
roeconomics paper, “Neural Signatures of Economic Preferences
for Risk and Ambiguity,” Huettel et al. (2006) argue:
Within pIFS (posterior inferior frontal sulcus), a dramatic effect of
ambiguity was observed compared with decisions involving risk.
At the outset of each trial, when subjects considered their options
and made a choice, activation was several times greater for deci-
sions involving ambiguity than decisions involving risk. . . . We
conclude that activation in pIFS, unlike in other regions, mediates
processes that counter cognitive impulsiveness in decisionmaking.
(767 and 770).
4Thinking through the implications of this for contemporary cognitive neu-
roscience, we might go back to one of its launching points, Plans and the
Structure of Behavior, by Miller et al. (1960), which is a sustained meditation
on what we might learn about the mind by contemplating its uneasy relation
to the model of brain-as-computer. While there is not enough space to inves-
tigate that book here, it would be a good starting point for asking the question
of how neuroscience might put economics into variation.
5Wittgenstein called these thought styles, “forms of life.”
While the paper uses this correlation to argue for mediation, per-
haps we should not treat this like a conclusion, but instead as the
beginning of a hypothesis rhizome. While there is a correlation,
the signal is quite noisy and variable across persons. Should we
not then ask, what behavior could be induced in participants to
really and reliably light up this region (pIFS)? In other words,
let’s assume that the weak but statistically significant correlation
is not in the brain region, but that the brain region is suggestively
yet poorly defined by this notion of “ambiguity and cognitive
impulsiveness.” Perhaps the brain region is doing something quite
different and we contemporary humans are improvisationally
appropriating it for the purposes of distinguishing ambiguity. Can
we use the region’s lighting up to figure out a better description of
the brain’s behavior?
A precursor to this type of questioning can be found in that
famous neuroscience study: “What the Frog’s Eye tells the Frog’s
Brain.” Lettvin et al. (1959) were trying to figure out what particu-
lar neurons cared about, “we analyze the activity of single fibers in
the optic nerve of a frog. Our method is to find what sort of stim-
ulus causes the largest activity in one nerve fiber and then what is
the exciting aspect of that stimulus such that variations in every-
thing else cause little change in the response.” Through lots of
creative trials, they found neurons that responded to small things
that moved like flies and ignored stationary things and ensembles
of things that moved together. But they didn’t stop. In a follow-up
paper, “Two Remarks on the Visual System of the Frog,” (Lettvin
et al., 1960) they offered:
Perhaps we had better say a word about our experimental proce-
dure,. . Our stimuli consisted of silhouettes of different size and
shape. . . moved against the background by means of magnets. . .
Response of a nerve fiber was measured roughly by frequency and
duration of firing. We took no records except those needed to illus-
trate our papers. Our question was not how great the response was
to one or another manipulation, but rather which visual events pro-
duced greatest response and which produced least, and what aspect
of the image could be varied without changing the response.We dealt
with our own listening to the patterns of nerve spikes as the mea-
sure of extremes, just as one does with an a–c bridge. (Emphasis
added).
For contemporary laboratories, this is not really a method. They
are taking up a playful relationship to the nerve fibers themselves,
asking, What can we do to the frog that will maximize the sig-
nal produced by particular nerves? Rather than staying with a
method, they were exploring whether they could let the nerve
fibers induce in the researchers a nerve-specific behavior—anti-
methodology by design:
We took no records except those needed to illustrate our papers. . .
Early in our work we found that taking records hindered rather
than helped this kind of research by leading to premature stan-
dardization of method.
They are calling for a plastic neuroscience, one whose methods
remain adaptable to what is called forth by the brain. This is
an abductive method, neither deductive nor inductive, but one
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in which the method is invented retroactively as if abducted or
possessed by the object one is trying to study6.
When I have presented this abductive approach to senior
researchers as well as to undergraduate neuroscience majors, I
received the same response, “Well that might be more ecologically
valid. . . but we couldn’t run a lab that way”(See Gibson, 1979).
But consider Lettvin et al.’s startling discovery:
“Sameness” Neurons
It is a bit embarrassing to present the following description so
batrachomorphically, but at least it reflects what we have found
so far. Every such cell, in fact, acts so complexly that we can hardly
describe its response save in terms ordinarily reserved for animal
behavior. . . It is silent. We bring in a (small) dark object. . . and at
a certain point in its travel, almost anywhere in the field, the cell
suddenly “notices” it. Thereafter, wherever that object is moved it
is tracked by the cell. Every time it moves, with even the faintest
jerk, there is burst of impulses that dies down to a mutter that
continues as long as the object is visible. If the object is kept mov-
ing, the bursts signal discontinuities in the movement, such as the
turning of corners, reversals, and so forth, and these bursts occur
against a continuous background mutter that tells us the object is
visible to the cell. When the target is removed, the discharge dies
down. If the target is kept stationary for about 2min, the mutter
also disappears. Then one can sneak the target around a bit, slowly,
and produce no response, until the cell “notices” it again and locks
on. Thereafter, no small or slow movement remains unsignaled.
. .There is also (we put this matter very hesitantly) an odd discrim-
ination in these cells, which, though we would not be surprised to
find it in the whole animal, is somewhat startling in single units so
early behind the retina. . . Suppose we have two similar targets. . .
It seems to attend one or the other, A or B; its output is not a
simple combination of the responses to both.
Here is a neuronal practice of attention—how a neuron (not a
frog, or a person) attends to something. This is not necessarily
what a human might want from attention (a gamer or hunter
or student might want something else, and they may be able to
recruit such a neuron into desired forms of attention). Through
their abductive playing with the neurons, the researchers thor-
oughly surprised themselves. Neurons as animals. Then they tried
to verify their finding:
These descriptions are provisional and may be too naturalistic in
character. However, we have examined well over a hundred cells
and suspect that what they do will not seem any simpler or less
startling with further study. . . Of course if one were to perform
the standard gestures, such as flashing a light at the eye, probably
the cells could be classified and described more easily. However,
it seems a shame for such sophisticated units to be handled that
way—roughly the equivalent of classifying people’s intelligence by
the startle response.
6Abduction as method was coined by Peirce (1903) in his fifth and sixth
Lectures on Pragmatism (Peirce, 1931–1958, 5.145). See Doyle (2003) . Hustak
and Myers (2012) describe Darwin’s methodological possession by orchids.
For contemporary Artificial Intelligence researchers, abduction is a process of
inferring or evolving a hypothesis from observations.
Soberly, they realize that had they standardized their method
early on, they would have gotten a perfectly acceptable (and pub-
lishable) result but it would have been one that conformed the
neurons to the method, rather than the other way around.
So how can we push this further and prevent having an
experimental design that is satisfied too easily: get a significant
correlation and publish. Can we imagine abductively playing with
the pIFS or oxytocin, using fMRI and TCS to figure out what they
are really up to? And in a way that might cause real surprise, even
call into question the current configuration of concepts of “pref-
erences,” “risk,” and “ambiguity”? Historians and anthropologists
of science have shown that in different times and cultures there
are stunningly different notions of rationality, risk, subjectivity,
sexuality, personhood, and dangerousness7 . Given this variability,
why should a brain structure necessarily do what a contemporary
person does?
To expand on the possibility of learning through abductive
play, consider the famous Halle Berry neuron: a fascinating exper-
iment in which a single neuron fired on pictures of Halle Berry,
caricatures of her, catwoman, and the letters “HALLE BERRY”
(Quiroga et al., 2005). But why did the experimenters stop with
well-known examples of that category?8Wouldn’t the main ques-
tion be to figure out where the edges of the category were for that
neuron?Were there really no surprises in what the neuron reacted
to or didn’t react to? Couldn’t this have been a way to figure out
what a neuron thinks a category, such as “Halle Berry,” is?
What a neuron thinks a category is—this is the radical promise
of neuroscience that I think we could pursue: we can ask a per-
son what a category is, but then we can also test a brain region,
a module, a circuit, skin (through GSR measures), and individ-
ual neurons for what of these biological units “thinks” a category
is. In each case, we might get different and even surprising
answers9 .
We can then ask: given that a neuron’s category is configured
in this way, how does a person today use that type of neuron to
have the sort of categories that our culture today makes use of?
Ramachandran (1998, 2003) shows that even after we figure out
what a bit of brain might be doing, there still remains the ques-
tion of what the human does with that bit. Whether a signal is
linked to an amputated limb, or indicates a person isn’t familiar
(as in Capgras syndrome), Ramachandran looks at how humans
improvise a coherent world such that there is a phantom limb, or
an alien substituted for one’s father. I emphasize “improvise” to
note that the coherence that results does not follow directly from
brain but is added by person or culture.
Ramachandran proposes that much of human life, culture,
is about exaptation, “a mechanism that originally evolved for
7For instance, historians Foucault (1978); Castel (1991); Laquer (1990), and
anthropologists such as Verran (2001) and Strathern (2004).
8There are of course very practical problems with the production of experi-
ments, including the length of time a subject can have their neuronsmeasured,
finding the neurons in the first place, etc. Andmany experimenters have much
more ambitious goals in mind. My critique here asks after the reason why
the step that gets rewarded by grants and published is the binary hypothesis
testing one.
9Or scaling up, we might ask what a family, a group, a culture, a nation thinks
“trust” or “risk” or a category are.
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one function and then provided the opportunity for something
very different. . . to evolve.” “Something very different” means that
knowing the origin of behavior or belief X is interesting, but it
does little if anything to explain how it is being used now.
Brains and neurons need to be approached this way, as poten-
tially alien things that each historical period and culture has
exapted to make its own coherence. From this perspective, stop-
ping at a correlation between a currently coherent behavior and a
neural module is ethnocentric!
To sum up then,
1. Why should a brain region do anything like what a person
does?
2. Correlations are not stopping points but starting points.
3. Play with method to maximize the region to understand what
it does.
4. Then investigate how a person improvises activity with that
brain structure.
In this manner we can render neuroscience plastic and learn what
our brains care about.
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